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BOARD DIVERSITY REVISITED: NEW 
RATIONALE, SAME OLD STORY?* 
LISA M. FAIRFAX** 
Recently, board diversity advocates have relied on market- or 
economic-based rationales to convince corporate America to increase 
the number of women and people of color in the boardroom, in lieu of 
moral or social justifications. This shift away from moral or social 
justifications has been deliberate, and it stems from a belief that 
corporate America would better respond to justifications that centered 
on the corporate bottom line. However, recent empirical data reveals 
that despite the increased reliance on, and apparent acceptance of, 
market- or economic-based rationales for board diversity, there has 
been little change in actual board diversity. This Article argues that the 
relative stagnation in board diversity can best be attributed to diversity 
advocates’ overemphasis on the importance of business rationales for 
diversity, coupled with their failure to acknowledge or otherwise bolster 
the importance of social and moral justifications for board diversity 
efforts. As a result, this Article not only concludes that business 
justifications may be insufficient, at least standing alone, to advance 
board diversity, but also insists that diversity advocates must pay 
greater attention to the role of social and moral justifications in the 
effort to diversify the corporate boardroom. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there has been considerable scholarly and 
regulatory focus on board diversity,1 defined in this Article as the 
portion of women and people of color on a corporate board.2 This 
focus is perhaps best exemplified by a new U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rule requiring public companies to 
provide disclosure of the extent to which their boards consider 
diversity in the director nomination process.3 This disclosure 
requirement appears to highlight the importance investors place on 
board diversity.4 
Historically, advocates of board diversity—like advocates of 
diversity in other sectors—relied on moral or social justifications to 
convince people of the desirability of such diversity.5 Such 
 1. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM 3–6 (2007); Lissa 
Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone 
Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 432 (2008). With regard to regulation, Norway passed a 
law requiring public companies to appoint women to hold some forty percent of board 
seats. Stephanie Holmes, Smashing the Glass Ceiling, BBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2008), 
www.http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7176879.stm. Moreover, in 2009, the SEC passed 
a rule requiring disclosures related to board diversity. See SEC Corporate Governance, 17 
C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010). 
 2. Although there are many different forms of diversity, including race, gender, 
national origin, sexual orientation, and viewpoint, consistent with my earlier articles, this 
Article focuses on gender, racial, and ethnic diversity. This Article uses the term “people 
of color” to refer to African Americans, Hispanic Americans/Latinos, Asian Americans, 
and Native Americans as a group. 
 3. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi); see also Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 
68,343–44 (Dec. 23, 2009) (discussing the reasons why the SEC found it important to adopt 
these measures). 
 4. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,355. 
 5. See David B. Wilkins, “From Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is 
Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the 
Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1553 (2004); see, e.g., J. Cunyon Gordon, 
Painting by Numbers: “And, Um, Let’s Have a Black Lawyer Sit at Our Table,” 71 
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justifications were premised on the notion that increasing diversity 
was the “right thing to do,” particularly because efforts to increase 
diversity were aimed at rectifying existing inequalities stemming from 
the lingering effects of slavery, segregation, and other forms of 
discrimination.6 
More recently, however, board diversity advocates have 
gravitated toward market- or economic-based rationales for 
advancing board diversity.7 These rationales, referred to herein as the 
“business case,” rely on the proposition that increased board diversity 
will improve the corporation’s bottom line.8 
This rhetorical shift toward the business case and away from 
moral or social rationales for diversity was deliberate, and it stemmed 
from a belief that corporate America would not—and in some cases 
could not—adequately pursue board diversity without sufficient 
business justifications for that pursuit.9 The belief that efforts to 
advance board diversity must focus on business rationales was based 
on at least three presumptions. First, many diversity advocates began 
to believe that historical rationales based on noneconomic, social or 
moral grounds had proven ineffective in compelling corporate 
America to diversify its boardroom.10 As a result, advocates believed 
they needed to develop and advance economic-based rationales that 
better appealed to members of the business community.11 Second, a 
number of legal decisions, beginning with the Supreme Court’s 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1257, 1277 (2003) (describing one university president’s attitude that 
diversity policies are just “the right thing to do”); Vance Knapp & Bonnie Kae Grover, 
The Corporate Law Firm—Can It Achieve Diversity?, 13 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 298, 303 
(1994) (“Law firms should hire more minority attorneys, of course, for reasons of simple 
justice.”); Taylor’s Perspective . . . : Law Firms Should Lash Back at the Diversity Backlash 
“Movement,” OF COUNSEL (Aspen Publishers, Inc., New York, N.Y.), June 2007, at 3, 4 
(“[S]ome law firms have sought to hire minority and women attorneys for the right 
reason—it’s the morally proper thing to do . . . .”). 
 6. Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1553. 
 7. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis 
of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 795, 839–
40; Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1548–55. 
 8. See Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85, 
85–86 (2000) (noting the importance of diversity to corporate America and its boards); 
Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1553; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) 
(relying in part on business leaders’ assertions of the importance of diversity to corporate 
America to uphold law school affirmative action policy). 
 9. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 839–40; Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1548–55.  
 10. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 839–40; Wilkins supra note 5, at 1568–71 (discussing 
how frustration with the slow pace of change has led to an embrace of rhetoric focusing on 
the business case). 
 11. See Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1570–71. 
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decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,12 not only 
evidenced a growing dissatisfaction with moral and social 
justifications for diversity, but also signaled a burgeoning 
receptiveness to more market-oriented arguments for diversity.13 
Third, it is entirely possible that corporate officers and directors did 
not feel comfortable pursuing board diversity unless such pursuit 
could be justified in terms of financial or economic rationales that 
seemed more consistent with their fiduciary duty to maximize firm 
value, and presumably to enhance shareholder returns.14 In this 
regard, the shift toward justifying board diversity through reliance on 
business rationales—and away from a focus on moral and social 
rationales—reflected a practical and strategic assessment that the 
business community would be more receptive and responsive to 
economically-oriented justifications for diversifying corporate 
boards.15 
At first glance, it seems as if this rhetorical shift has achieved its 
goal. Importantly, several studies appear to establish a link between 
board diversity and improved financial performance, thereby 
providing important empirical support for board diversity’s business 
case.16 These studies help validate the business case and this 
validation appears to have increased rhetorical support for board 
diversity. In other words, corporations and critical members of the 
investment community, including the SEC, appear more willing to 
acknowledge the importance of board diversity, and that willingness 
appears to be correlated with an acknowledgement of the merits of 
the business case.17 Indeed, the SEC’s acknowledgement of those 
merits appears to have played a role in its adoption of disclosure rules 
in this area, suggesting that the business case has paved the way for 
important legislative changes.18 
However, a closer inspection of the current empirical data 
reveals that, despite the increased reliance and focus on business 
rationales for board diversity, there has been little change in actual 
board diversity.19 Instead, the percentage of women and people of 
 12. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 13. See id. at 307–08 (plurality opinion); Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1554–55, 1558. 
 14. Fairfax, supra note 7, at 841. 
 15. See Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1568–71. 
 16. See infra Part I.A (discussing empirical evidence related to board diversity). 
 17. See infra Part I.B (discussing rhetorical support for the business case). 
 18. See infra Part I.C (discussing the adoption of the disclosure rule, and the SEC’s 
acknowledgement of the merits of the business case). 
 19. See infra Part II (discussing empirical data on the amount of diversity in corporate 
boardrooms). 
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color on boards has been relatively stagnant, particularly over the last 
five years.20 
This Article argues that this relative stagnation has implications 
for the merits of the business case as a tool in advancing board 
diversity. In fact, this Article argues that such stagnation can best be 
attributed to diversity advocates’ overemphasis on the extent to 
which the business case can impact board diversity efforts, along with 
their simultaneous underemphasis on the important role that social 
and moral justifications must continue to play in such efforts. In this 
regard, this Article concludes that the business case, standing alone, is 
insufficient to ensure enhanced diversity in the boardroom. 
This Article reaches this conclusion by critically examining why 
the increased embrace of the business case has not translated into 
increased board diversity. On the one hand, there may exist other 
factors that not only explain the empirical evidence related to board 
diversity, but also suggest that any conclusion about the merits of the 
business case may be premature or unreliable.21 If these explanations 
have merit, then they may undermine any conclusion that reliance on 
the business case has proven unsuccessful. However, this Article 
contends that while other factors may have played a role in the 
relative stagnation in board diversity, they do not fully explain it. 
Rather, the most likely reason for the stagnation appears to be the 
relative ineffectiveness of the business case, at least standing alone, in 
motivating corporations to diversify their boards. This conclusion has 
important implications for board diversity efforts, suggesting that 
diversity advocates need to alter their strategy in this area. 
Part I of this Article demonstrates the apparent success of the 
strategic shift toward relying on business rationales to support the 
board diversity effort. This Part not only reveals an increase in 
empirical evidence supporting the business case for diversity, but also 
shows a growing rhetorical acceptance and acknowledgement of the 
legitimacy of the business case among corporations and members of 
the business community. Part I concludes by outlining the new SEC 
rule on board diversity, which appears to have been premised on the 
validity of the business case for board diversity. In sharp contrast to 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. For example, one may argue that the economic crisis may have created special 
challenges for all diversity efforts. Then too, it is also arguable that it may be too soon to 
ascertain the impact of the SEC’s new disclosure rule related to board diversity. To the 
extent that the rule stemmed from an acknowledgement of the merits of the business case, 
it also may be arguable that it is too soon to ascertain the impact of that case. Part III 
addresses these and other factors more fully. 
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the supposition that embracing the business case would increase 
board diversity, Part II highlights empirical evidence revealing that 
such an embrace apparently has had no impact on changing the status 
quo in terms of board diversity. Part III explores reasons for that lack 
of impact, concluding that while the business case for board diversity 
may prove rhetorically appealing, it is insufficient on its own to 
ensure a full commitment to board diversity. 
I.  THE BUSINESS CASE MAKES ITS CASE 
The business case for board diversity encompasses a variety of 
different strands.22 The unifying theme of those strands, however, is 
that board diversity positively impacts corporate performance and the 
corporation’s bottom line.23 The effort to develop and advance this 
theme appears to have garnered positive results in at least three 
respects. First, currently there is some empirical evidence 
demonstrating a positive link between board diversity and firm 
performance or positive corporate governance effects, thus seeming 
to support the business case for diversity.24 Second, there seems to be 
an increased (albeit rhetorical) acceptance of the importance of board 
diversity to the corporate bottom line from both business 
organizations and influential business leaders.25 Third, the SEC 
recently adopted a rule requiring disclosure related to board 
diversity.26 Such adoption was based, at least in part, on investors’ 
growing recognition of a connection between board diversity and 
corporate performance.27 In their own way, therefore, each of these 
developments reflects increased acceptance of the business case for 
board diversity and hence positive developments for those who stress 
the importance of that case for board diversity efforts. 
A. The Empirical Case 
Perhaps the most devastating criticism of the business case for 
board diversity is that there is no empirical evidence or data to 
support the case. Indeed, unlike moral and social rationales, business 
 22. See David A. Carter et al., The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and 
Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE 396, 398 
(2010); Fairfax, supra note 7, at 810. 
 23. Carter et al., supra note 22, at 398; Fairfax, supra note 7, at 810.  
 24. See infra Part I.A. 
 25. See infra Part I.B. 
 26. SEC Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010); Proxy 
Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343–44, 68,364 (Dec. 23, 2009). 
 27. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,355. 
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rationales are susceptible to proof, and thus seem to require that 
diversity advocates establish the validity of the claims underlying such 
rationales.28 Diversity advocates have expended considerable 
resources attempting to establish some empirical support for the 
business case.29 Those efforts have translated into some tentative 
success. 
Thus, there has been a growing body of studies establishing a 
positive relationship between board diversity and improved financial 
performance, measured in terms of various financial metrics including 
returns on equity, returns on sales, and returns on invested capital.30 
In one study, Catalyst found that companies with higher percentages 
of women directors financially outperformed those with lower 
percentages by significant margins.31 Catalyst also found stronger-
than-average performance at companies with at least three women 
directors.32 Another study revealed that, over a five year period, the 
stocks of companies with significant board diversity outperformed 
both the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the NASDAQ 100, 
 28. See, e.g., Carter et al., supra note 22, at 397 (noting the importance of establishing 
that diversity actually enhances shareholder value). 
 29. See Press Release, Catalyst, Alliance for Board Diversity: Fact Sheet (May 11, 
2005), http://www.catalyst.org/press-release/117/alliance-for-board-diversity-fact-sheet 
(describing how the Alliance for Board Diversity has dedicated resources to generate 
research that makes the business case for board diversity). 
 30. See, e.g., Niclas L. Erhardt et al., Board of Director Diversity and Firm Financial 
Performance, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE 102, 107 (2003) (revealing a positive relationship 
between gender, racial, and ethnic board diversity and both return on investment and 
return on assets); Kathleen A. Farrell & Phillip L. Hersch, Additions to Corporate Boards: 
The Effect of Gender, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 85, 86 (2005) (noting a positive relationship 
between return on assets and the likelihood of adding women directors); Lois Joy et al., 
The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and Women’s Representation on Boards, 
CATALYST (2007), http://www.catalyst.org/file/139/bottom%20line%202.pdf (finding a 
positive correlation between corporate performance and higher percentage of women 
board directors); VIRTCOM CONSULTING, BOARD DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY: 
REALIZING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE 4–5 (2009), 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/press/news/invest-corp/diversification-strategy 
.pdf [hereinafter VIRTCOM WHITE PAPER]. A study of companies in Finland revealed 
similar results, showing that companies with significant female board members had 
stronger returns on assets than those with male majorities. See ANNU KOTIRANTA ET AL., 
FINNISH BUS. & POLICY FORUM EVA, FEMALE LEADERSHIP AND FIRM PROFITABILITY 
4–5 (2007), available at http://www.eva.fi/wp-content/uploads/files/2133_Analyysi_no 
_003_eng_FemaleLeadership.pdf; see also VIRTCOM WHITE PAPER, supra, at 12 
(discussing the correlation between female leadership and improved profitability found in 
the Kotiranta et al. study). 
 31. Joy et al., supra note 30. 
 32. Id. This finding not only supports the business case for board diversity, but also 
supports the theory that such a case can best be supported when boards achieve a critical 
mass of women and people of color. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 837 (discussing the 
importance of critical mass for people of color on boards); Joy et al., supra note 30. 
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though they did not outperform the Standard & Poor’s 500 (“S&P 
500”).33 One study of U.S. firms found a positive relationship between 
board gender diversity and Tobin’s q,34 while another study of U.S. 
firms found a significant positive relationship between the 
percentages of women and ethnic minorities on the board and return 
on assets and equity.35 Moreover, Virtcom Consulting (“Virtcom”), a 
firm commissioned by the California Public Emloyees’ Retirement 
System (“CalPERS”), the nation’s largest public pension fund and a 
leading corporate activist,36 found in several instances that financial 
performance improved after a company implemented diversity 
initiatives.37 
Of course, even this empirical evidence can be attacked as 
inadequate because at best it reveals correlation, not causation. In 
fact, researchers in this area clearly acknowledge the difficulties with 
establishing causation.38 For example, it is not clear if better-
performing companies (because of their increased resources, greater 
public scrutiny, or more prestige) attract diverse board candidates, or 
if diverse board candidates lead to better-performing companies.39 
Along with these favorable studies are those that demonstrate 
different results. At least one study suggests a negative correlation 
between board diversity and firm value.40 Some suggest that there is 
 33. VIRTCOM WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 10. The stocks of companies with a 
significant number of diverse directors gained 16.2% from July 2003 to July 2008, 
compared to 21.7% for the S&P 500, 15.9% for the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and 
2.8% for the NASDAQ. Id. 
 34. Tobin’s q refers to the ratio between the market value of a firm divided by the 
replacement cost of its assets. See Carter et al., supra note 22, at 403. 
 35. See David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity and Firm 
Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 51 (2003); Erhardt et al., supra note 30, at 107; see also Carter et 
al., supra note 22, at 399–400 (discussing studies). 
 36. See CALPERS CORP. GOVERNANCE, http://www.calpers-governance.org (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2011); Stephen Choi & Jill Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence 
on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. 
REV. 315, 315 (2008).  
 37. See VIRTCOM WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 15–22 (discussing a series of case 
studies in which Virtcom revealed that corporate focus on diversity initiatives had a 
significant impact on the corporation’s bottom line). For example, IBM partnered its 
marketing group with women and ethnic minority employees to focus on potential women 
and ethnic minority customers, and raised sales from such employees from $10 million in 
1998 to over $300 million in 2003. Id. at 17. Similarly, Johnson Controls formed a series of 
joint ventures with minority-owned businesses that led to nearly $6 billion in new profits. 
Id. at 18. 
 38. See Broome & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 433.  
 39. See id. at 433–34. 
 40. See Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their 
Impact on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 292–93 (2009) (finding that 
female board members have a positive and significant impact on corporate governance, 
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no link between board diversity and firm value.41 Importantly, one 
study attempted to test for a causal link between board diversity and 
improved financial performance by examining U.S. based firms in the 
Fortune 500, and did not find “any empirical evidence of causation 
going from board diversity to financial performance, either positive or 
negative.”42 The existence of these studies suggests that the business 
case for board diversity is both equivocal and more nuanced than 
once thought.43 Such an assessment is consistent with the presumption 
that the business case for diversity may only find empirical support 
under particular circumstances,44 such as when boards have a critical 
mass of diverse directors.45 
Regardless of the mixed nature of the evidence, the empirical 
record is likely a net positive for diversity advocates and the business 
case. To be sure, there is considerably more work to be done in this 
area. However, even the most recent study finding no causal 
connection between board diversity and firm performance not only 
found some positive relationship between board diversity and firm 
performance, but also underscored the fact that the study found “no 
evidence of a negative link between board diversity and financial 
but they have a negative impact on firm performance measured in terms of Tobin’s q and 
return on assets—though women directors may have a more positive impact on firm 
performance in a firm with weak shareholder rights because women tend to be better 
monitors). 
 41. See TROND RANDØY ET AL., A NORDIC PERSPECTIVE ON CORPORATE BOARD 
DIVERSITY 21–24 (2006), available at http://www.nordicinnovation.net/_img/a_ 
nordic_perspective_on_board_diversity_final_web.pdf (finding that board diversity in 
terms of gender, age, and nationality had no significant impact on stock market 
performance or returns on assets within the 500 largest companies in Denmark, Norway, 
and Sweden); Farrell & Hersch, supra note 30, at 86; Caspar Rose, Does Female Board 
Representation Influence Firm Performance? The Danish Evidence, 15 CORP. 
GOVERNANCE 404, 404 (2007). 
 42. Carter et al., supra note 22, at 411. 
 43. See Broome & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 434–35. 
 44. See Carter et al., supra note 22, at 411 (noting that the body of research suggesting 
no relationship between board composition and firm performance may be attributed to 
the fact that “under some conditions board diversity has a positive effect on financial 
performance and under other conditions board diversity has a negative effect, [so that] 
over time and many firms, the results may cancel out leaving no measurable result”). 
 45. The literature related to critical mass suggests that people of color may not feel 
comfortable expressing their views within a group if they are the only one or one of a few 
diverse people in the group. See Emily Calhoun, An Essay on the Professional 
Responsibility of Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 1, 14–15 (2002); Fairfax, supra note 7, at 837; Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven Andrew 
Light, Teaching Race Without a Critical Mass: Reflections on Affirmative Action and the 
Diversity Rationale, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 316, 317–18 (2004); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306, 318–19 (2003) (emphasizing the importance of critical mass to ensuring that 
students of color express their views). 
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performance,” and hence that their evidence did not refute the 
business case.46 When taken together, there exists at least some—
albeit tentative—empirical support that board diversity may lead to 
increased firm value or improved corporate governance under some 
conditions. 
B. The Rhetorical Case 
Increasingly, business leaders also appear to be embracing board 
diversity based on business rationales. Key leaders in the business and 
investment community, from Calvert Group Ltd. (“Calvert”) to 
CalPERS, the National Association of Corporate Directors, and the 
Conference Board,47 have embraced the business rationale for 
diversity.48 For example, the Council of Institutional Investors (the 
“Council”), an association of public, union, and corporate pension 
funds, publishes a set of policies to serve as guidelines for what it 
believes to be corporate best practices; these policies include support 
for board diversity.49 However, in 2009 the Council amended its board 
diversity statement to make clear that support for board diversity was 
based on the Council’s belief that a diverse board “can enhance 
corporate financial performance.”50 The amendment was designed to 
reflect studies suggesting the positive connection between board 
diversity and firm performance.51 
The following comments from Calvert to the SEC further 
illustrate the business community’s embrace of the business case: 
Diversity is a critical attribute to a well functioning board and 
an essential measure of good governance. In an increasingly 
 46. Carter et al., supra note 22, at 411. 
 47. The Conference Board is a business organization supported by business 
executives that convenes conferences and conducts business management research, with a 
membership representing over 1,400 companies including nearly half of the Fortune 500. 
See Our Community, CONFERENCE BD., http://www.conference-board.org/about/index 
.cfm?id=1975 (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). 
 48. See, e.g., CAROLYN BRANCATO & JEANETTE PATTERSON, BOARD DIVERSITY IN 
U.S. CORPORATIONS: BEST PRACTICES FOR BROADENING THE PROFILE OF 
CORPORATE BOARDS 6–7 (1999) (noting that diversity is a key part of good governance); 
VIRTCOM WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 6 (study commissioned by CalPERS). 
 49. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
POLICIES 4 (2010), available at http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/CII%20Corp%20Gov 
%20Policies%20Full%20and%20Current%204-13-10.pdf. 
 50. Press Release, Council of Institutional Investors, Council Adopts New Policies 
and Endorses Principles for Reform of the U.S. System of Financial Market Regulation 
(May 11, 2009), http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/press%20release%20on%20new%20 
policies%2005-11-09.pdf.  
 51. See id. 
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complex global marketplace, the ability to draw on a wide 
range of viewpoints, backgrounds, skills, experience and 
expertise internally increases the likelihood of making the right 
decisions. Director and nominee diversity that includes race, 
gender, culture, age, and geography helps to ensure that 
different perspectives are brought to bear on issues, while 
enhancing the likelihood that proposed solutions will be 
nuanced and comprehensive.52 
In addition to these business leaders, many companies and 
directors express a desire for board diversity. For example, one 
survey demonstrated that several major companies expressed a 
commitment to considering diversity in the selection of board 
members.53 Similarly, a recent study of S&P 500 boards found that 
such boards rank diversity at the top of their wish list of what they 
look for in board candidates, second only to financial expertise.54 
Given the sentiment expressed by many in the corporate world that 
diversity without a business case was an insufficient reason to act, this 
ranking seems to be based on a belief in the business case.55 To be 
sure, not all corporations, investors, and directors express a 
commitment to board diversity or otherwise embrace the business 
case for diversity. However, the increased reliance on economic and 
market rationales to justify the importance of board diversity reflects 
the growing rhetorical acceptance of the business case within the 
corporate community. 
C. The SEC’s Case 
In December 2009, the SEC approved a rule requiring disclosure 
of whether and to what extent a corporation’s nominating committee 
considers diversity when nominating candidates to the board of 
 52. Letter from William M. Tartikoff, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Calvert 
Grp., Ltd., and Ivy Wafford Duke, Assistant Vice President & Deputy Gen. Counsel, 
Calvert Grp., Ltd. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Sept. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.calvertgroup.com/NRC/literature/documents/sri-20100125-SEC-Proxy-
Disclosure.pdf. 
 53. See generally Corporate Board Diversity Disclosure Scorecard, CALVERT INVS. 
(Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.calvert.com/nrc/external/sec-scorecard.pdf [hereinafter 
Disclosure Scorecard] (pinpointing several companies with disclosure on diversity prior to 
the SEC’s new requirement). 
 54. See SPENCER STUART, 2009 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 15 (2009), available 
at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/SSBI2009.pdf. 
 55. See Carter et al., supra note 35, at 35.  
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directors.56 Under the rule, corporations must disclose “whether, and 
if so how, the nominating committee . . . considers diversity in 
identifying nominees for director.”57 If the nominating committee or 
the board has “a policy with regard to the consideration of diversity in 
identifying director nominees,” the final rules require disclosure “of 
how this policy is implemented” and “how the nominating committee 
(or the board) assesses the effectiveness of its policy.”58 This rule 
became effective February 28, 2010.59 
This new rule seems to reflect an implicit endorsement of the 
legitimacy of the business rationale for board diversity.60 Specifically, 
in explaining its reasons for adopting the new rule, the SEC 
referenced, among other things, the fact that commentators noted the 
appearance of a “meaningful relationship between diverse boards and 
improved corporate financial performance.”61 In this regard, the 
SEC’s willingness to adopt the new rule can be directly linked to the 
apparently increased acceptance of the business case. 
As this Part reveals, by emphasizing—and at least providing 
tentative support for—the business case for board diversity, diversity 
advocates have managed to encourage corporations and other 
relevant agencies and entities to acknowledge, and at least 
rhetorically support, the business case. 
II.  BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY: DIVERSITY BY THE 
NUMBERS 
Unfortunately, the apparent acknowledgment of the business 
case has not translated into changes in board diversity. Because 
corporations are not required to report on the diversity of their 
directors, the statistics in this area are difficult to obtain and often 
vary slightly. However, they all highlight the same troubling reality: 
diversity has remained relatively unchanged over the past several 
years. 
The empirical data related to the presence of women and people 
of color on corporate boards reflects this lack of change. From 2005 
to 2007, the percentage of Fortune 1000 corporate boards with at least 
 56. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010). The new rule amends Item 407(c) of 
Regulation S-K. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343 (Dec. 23, 
2009). 
 57. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,334. 
 60. See id. at 68,343. 
 61. Id. 
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one woman only grew by 1%, from 84% to 85%.62 Similarly, in 2009, 
89% of S&P 500 companies had at least one female director, up from 
88% in 2004.63 
A similar pattern emerges with respect to people of color. The 
number of Fortune 1000 companies with at least one person of color 
on the board grew 2%, from 76% to 78%.64 The lack of progress has 
been the same for all ethnic groups, and in fact, such groups’ 
percentage representation on the board has remained virtually 
unchanged since 2003.65 Similarly, 85% of the largest 200 S&P 500 
boards have at least one person of color, reflecting no change since 
2005.66 While these statistics reveal that most companies have at least 
one person of color or woman on their board, they also suggest that 
representation of such groups on the corporate board has “hit a 
barrier.”67 
Perhaps more troubling is the relative stagnation in the total 
number of board seats that women and people of color held. With 
respect to S&P 1500 board seats, women held 12% of such seats in 
2008, “which [was] unchanged from 2005.”68 The story remains the 
same with respect to Fortune 500 boards. In 2003, women held 13.6% 
 62. KORN/FERRY INST., 34TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 7 (n.d.), 
available at http://www.kornferryinstitute.com/files/pdf1/Board_Study07_LoRez_FINAL 
.pdf. 
 63. SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 17. 
 64. KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 62, at 7. 
 65. See id. at 18. In 2003 and 2007, 47% of Fortune 1000 boards had at least one 
African American director, 19% had at least one Latino director, and the number of 
boards with at least one Asian board member rose from 10% to 11%. Id.  
 66. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 18. To be sure, there has been some 
change in the type of persons of color that hold board seats. See id. Hence, while the 
number of corporations with at least one Latino director has remained basically 
unchanged (from 39% in 2005 to 40% in 2009), there has been an increase in the number 
of corporations with at least one Asian director (from 9% in 2005 to 14% in 2009) coupled 
with a decrease in the percentage of corporations with at least one African American 
director (from 84% in 2005 to 79% in 2009). Id. 
 67. KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 62, at 4, 6–7. 
 68. RISKMETRICS GRP., BOARD PRACTICES: TRENDS IN BOARD STRUCTURE AT 
S&P 1,500 COMPANIES 1 (2008) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). A board 
diversity study of the fifty largest corporations in North Carolina revealed that in 2010, 
12.3% of the board seats were held by women, as compared to 11.2% in 2006, while 7.1% 
of such seats were held by people of color, up from 6% since 2006. Corporate Board 
Diversity Gains in State, But Lags Fortune 100, UNC Study Reports, UNC NEWS (May 24, 
2010), http://uncnews.unc.edu/content/view/3661/70/. 
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of Fortune 500 board seats;69 in 2008 that number had risen less than 
2% to 15.2% of total Fortune 500 directorships.70 
With respect to people of color, empirical evidence reveals that 
they hold 10% of S&P 1500 board seats—“unchanged . . . since 
2004.”71 In addition, in 2007 people of color held 11% of the board 
seats in S&P 500, as compared to 10% of such seats in 2000.72 Thus, 
there has been a mere 1% growth in seven years. For women of color, 
the statistical increase is even smaller as compared to women and 
people of color, generally. In 2003, women of color held 3% of 
Fortune 500 seats, and by 2008, that number had risen by 0.2% to 
3.2% of directorships.73 
Importantly, the percentage of women and people of color has 
remained unchanged even as corporations have added board seats. 
From 2004 to 2006, although Fortune 100 companies added twenty-
four new board seats, women and people of color collectively had a 
net gain of three Fortune 100 board seats.74 This statistic suggests that 
corporations have not filled new director seats with women and 
people of color.75 Instead, the empirical evidence reveals that within 
the last several years, the overall representation of women and people 
of color on boards has remained relatively static.76 This stagnation 
 69. CATALYST, 2003 CATALYST CENSUS OF WOMEN BOARD DIRECTORS 1 (2003), 
available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/76/2003%20catalyst%20census%20wbd.pdf. 
 70. See CATALYST, 2008 CATALYST CENSUS OF WOMEN BOARD DIRECTORS OF THE 
FORTUNE 500, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/242/08_census_wbd 
_jan.pdf. 
 71. RISKMETRICS GRP., supra note 68, at 1. 
 72. Phred Dvorak, Some Things Don’t Change, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14. 2008, at R4 
(citing study by Investor Shareholder Services (now known as MSCI)). Indeed, one study 
reveals that the percentage of African Americans on Fortune 500 companies’ boards has 
declined, with such directors holding 8.1% of seats in 2004 and 7.4% of directorships in 
2008. African Americans Lost Ground on Fortune 500 Boards: Blacks Remain Seriously 
Underrepresented, EXEC. LEADERSHIP COUNCIL (July 17, 2009), http://www.elcinfo.com/ 
BoardCensus.php (describing study of Fortune 500 boards); see also Letter from Carl 
Brooks, President & CEO, Exec. Leadership Council, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, 
SEC 1 (Sept. 15, 2009) (citing 2008 study of African Americans on Fortune 500 boards), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-142.pdf. 
 73. CATALYST, supra note 69, at 1; CATALYST, supra note 70, at 2. 
 74. THE ALLIANCE FOR BD. DIVERSITY, WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON FORTUNE 
100 BOARDS 5 (2008), available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/86/1-17-08%20abd%20 
study.pdf. 
 75. Indeed, while boards rated finding diverse directors as one of their top priorities 
in seeking to fill new board positions, the number of such directors actually nominated and 
elected does not reflect this priority. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 15.  
 76. KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 62, at 6–7. 
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runs counter to the expectation and hope that board reforms would 
positively impact board diversity.77 
More critically, this stagnation also runs counter to expectations 
regarding the manner in which an increased acceptance of the 
business case for board diversity would impact diversity efforts and 
results. Indeed, diversity advocates had hoped that relying on the 
business case would prompt corporations to increase their diversity 
efforts. Instead, these numbers reveal that such reliance may have 
had little impact on such efforts. 
III.  THE BUSINESS CASE AND ROADBLOCKS TO BOARD DIVERSITY 
The relative stagnation in board diversity that the empirical data 
highlights is likely due to the inadequacies of the business rationale 
itself. In order to support this assertion, this Part considers, but 
ultimately rejects, other explanations for the empirical evidence set 
forth in Part II.  
Indeed, it could be possible that factors other than the 
ineffectiveness of the business case better explain the empirical 
evidence in the previous section. This Article examines three 
alternative explanations for the relative stagnation in board diversity. 
First, one may argue that the economic crisis stymied corporate 
diversity efforts, not only making any current data in this area 
unreliable, but also making it difficult to conclusively assess the 
impact of the business case. Second, it may be too soon to assess how 
the SEC’s new disclosure rule will impact diversity efforts; further, to 
the extent the rule was prompted by an enhanced embrace of the 
business case, it also may be too soon to assess the impact of the 
business case. Third, it is possible that the relative stagnation reflects 
the fact that the corporate community is still unconvinced by the 
empirical evidence related to board diversity. From this perspective, 
perhaps additional or more rigorous empirical data in this area will 
eventually turn the tide in favor of increased board diversity. To the 
extent any of these rationales are compelling, they undermine the 
contention that the business case has proven unsuccessful. However, 
an analysis of these rationales reveals that they fall short of fully 
explaining the empirical data. As a result, the relative stagnation in 
board diversity strongly suggests that the strategy of building and 
proving the business case has failed to sufficiently motivate 
corporations. 
 77. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 803–11. 
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This Article seeks to assess the reason for that failure. Indeed, 
perhaps diversity advocates placed too much emphasis on trying to 
determine the most appropriate justifications for board diversity. 
Instead, other factors may have a more significant impact on 
determining whether corporations can and will implement policies 
that foster diversity. Such factors include adequate responses to the 
pool problem,78 the need for a significant shift in board culture, and a 
better recognition and understanding of the impact of ingrained 
biases on diversity efforts. These other factors play a critical role in 
issues affecting board diversity, and coupled with the business case’s 
rhetorical appeal, may suggest that ensuring corporate support of the 
business case was a necessary, but not sufficient, strategy for 
eventually achieving significant board diversity. 
Part III first considers other explanations for the disappointing 
empirical data in this area and then discusses the drawbacks inherent 
in a diversity strategy that relies primarily, if not completely, on the 
business case. 
A. The Economics of Diversity 
In 2008, the worst financial and economic crisis since the Great 
Depression hit the United States and other global markets.79 That 
crisis may have created special challenges for diversity efforts. If these 
challenges sufficiently account for the stalled diversity numbers, then, 
at the very least, the crisis may undermine our ability to assess the 
relative merits of the business case. 
First, the mere existence of the economic and financial crisis may 
make it difficult for corporations to focus on anything beyond 
survival. As a result of the economic environment, corporations have 
had to make difficult choices regarding how best to allocate scarce 
resources in order to survive and begin the process of returning to 
prosperity. Board diversity may be one casualty of these choices and 
budgetary constraints.80 Then, too, identifying and recruiting new, 
 78. See infra Part III.D.2 (describing the pool problem as the notion that the pool of 
candidates for a diverse board may be relatively small based on the customary preference 
for active or retired executives and CEOs). 
 79. See Anthony Faiola, The End of American Capitalism?, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 
2008, at A1; Press Release, Bus. Wire, Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial 
Crisis Since Great Depression; Risks Increase if Right Steps Are Not Taken (Feb. 27, 
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS193520+27-Feb-2009+BW 20090 
227. 
 80. See Heather Arnet & M.J. Tocci, Why Diversity Matters, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Mar. 17, 2009, at E22; William Schackelford, Doing Diversity in Tough 
Economic Times, WORKFORCE DIVERSITY NETWORK, 1, http://www.workforcediversity 
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diverse candidates likely requires additional outreach efforts and the 
expenditure of additional resources, which the current crisis may 
make more difficult. From this perspective, the mere existence of an 
economic crisis poses challenges for diversity efforts. 
In addition, the financial crisis appears to have encouraged 
corporations to focus their board recruitment efforts on criteria that 
may have a negative impact on board diversity. Evidence reveals that 
the financial crisis has prompted corporations to actively seek out 
more “experienced” board members.81 As an initial matter, this has 
translated into a focus on directors who previously have served on 
boards. Thus, in 2009, only sixteen percent of new S&P directors were 
first timers, by far the smallest percentage in recent years.82 In the 
past five years, the total number of new appointees to S&P 500 
boards dropped by twenty-five percent.83 Given the relatively small 
numbers of women and people of color currently serving on boards,84 
the decrease in the number of first-time board members may well 
explain the relative stagnation in diverse directors. 
In addition to the focus on prior board service, the economic 
crisis also has prompted corporations to increase their preference for 
directors who are retired CEOs or other corporate executives, placing 
directors with such experience at the top of their wish list for new 
directors.85 As a result, the demand for such directors far outstrips the 
supply.86 Indeed, “[a]lmost a third of new female . . . directors are 
current or former [executives].”87 In light of the small percentage of 
women and people of color in executive suites,88 the focus on 
executive level experience further undermines any attempts to 
diversify boards. While it is unclear what kind of impact the increased 
emphasis on prior service and executive experience will have on a 
corporation’s financial performance, it is clear that it does not bode 
network.com/docs/Articles/Article_DoingDiversityToughTimes_11.08.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2011). But see Heather Joslyn, Belts Tightened by Recession, Diversity Officers 
Stretch Resources, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Sept. 17, 2009, at D5 (noting that while the 
pressure of the economic downturn has made it difficult for some organizations to focus 
on hiring, other organizations have continued to make strides in hiring diversity officers). 
 81. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 13. 
 82. Id. at 12. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See supra Part II. 
 85. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 12–13. 
 86. See id. 
 87. Id. at 14. 
 88. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Some Reflections on the Diversity of Corporate Boards: 
Women, People of Color, and the Unique Issues Associated with Women of Color, 79 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 1105, 1112 (2005). 
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well for board diversity. In this regard, the economic crisis appears to 
have narrowed the criteria corporations use to identify board 
candidates, thereby limiting the ability of corporations to engage in 
significant diversity efforts. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that the economic crisis may 
have skewed the results of diversity efforts by shrinking the pool of 
diverse candidates and making it more difficult to dedicate resources 
toward expanding that pool. It could be that once the crisis passes, 
corporations will be better positioned and equipped to enhance 
diversity in a meaningful manner. As a result, it is arguable that such 
a crisis hampers any attempt to draw conclusions about the 
effectiveness of the business case or overall diversity efforts. 
However, such an argument rings hollow simply because the 
apparent stagnation in diversity appears to have predated the 
economic crisis. Indeed, diversity efforts in this area appeared to have 
stalled as early as 2005, at least a couple of years before 2007 and 
2008, when the current crisis fully emerged.89 From this perspective, 
while the economic crisis may have exacerbated diversity efforts, the 
crisis cannot shoulder the full blame for why diversity efforts appear 
to have stalled out. 
B. The Novelty of the SEC’s Disclosure Rule 
One may also argue that the relative newness of the SEC’s 
disclosure rule on diversity may make it difficult to truly assess the 
impact of the business case. In other words, it may be too soon to tell 
how the SEC’s new disclosure rule will impact diversity efforts. As a 
result, it also may be premature to speculate as to how the business 
rationale has impacted board diversity. 
On the one hand, the mere fact that the SEC has adopted such a 
rule may be viewed as a success for the business case because the 
rationale appeared to influence the SEC’s decision in this area. Not 
only did many SEC comment letters focus on such a rationale, but the 
SEC highlighted the rationale in its adoptive release.90 In particular, 
the SEC noted that the new rule could enhance board quality and 
decision making, two key components of the business rationale.91 
 89. See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text. 
 90. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343 (Dec. 23, 2009) 
(“Commenters also noted that there appears to be a meaningful relationship between 
diverse boards and improved corporate financial performance, and that diverse boards can 
help companies more effectively recruit talent and retain staff.”). 
 91. Id. at 68,355. 
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Hence, regardless of the rule’s impact, the mere adoption of the rule 
suggests the benefits of embracing the business case. 
Additionally, the rule could significantly increase the number of 
corporations that adopt diversity policies. To be sure, the SEC 
insisted that the rule was “not intended to steer behavior.”92 
However, the SEC also recognized that because of the rule, boards 
could find it “beneficial” to disclose and follow a board diversity 
policy.93 In other words, because corporations may wish to avoid 
admitting that they do not have a board diversity policy, the rule may 
encourage corporations to adopt such a policy. The SEC also 
recognized that the rule could encourage boards to conduct broader 
director searches that focus on candidates with a wider range of 
qualities and characteristics.94 In these ways, the SEC acknowledged 
that the rule could prompt more corporations to embrace diversity 
procedures. 
There is at least some tentative evidence indicating that the rule 
could have a positive impact on the corporate adoption of diversity 
statements. As a result of the rule, several law firms already have 
recommended that corporations without such policies consider 
adopting them.95 This kind of recommendation suggests that the rule 
could spur a more widespread adoption of board diversity policies. 
Indeed, a limited study indicated that, as a result of the SEC rule, 
some corporations have altered their diversity statements to be more 
inclusive, while others that previously had no policy either have 
stated an intention to consider diversity when recruiting directors or 
have expressed a belief in the importance of diversity.96 
Moreover, the rule could facilitate the adoption of more effective 
policies. To be sure, there is no guarantee that an increased adoption 
of board diversity policies will translate into an increased amount of 
actual board diversity. However, the SEC’s rule increases the 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See, e.g., Mark Poerio et al., SEC Rule Changes for 2010: Be Ready to Be Held 
Accountable, STAY CURRENT (PaulHastings, L.A., Cal.), Jan. 2010, at 1, 8, available at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1479.pdf; SEC Adopts Proxy Rules 
Changes for 2010 Proxy Season, LEGAL NEWS ALERT (Foley & Lardner LLP, Chi., Ill.), 
Dec. 2009, at 1, 4, available at http://www.foley.com/abc.aspx?Publication=6687; Robert A. 
Friedel, Amended SEC Disclosure Requirements: Practice Pointers to Facilitate 
Compliance in 2010, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.pepperlaw.com/ 
publications_update.aspx?ArticleKey=1667. 
 96. See Disclosure Scorecard, supra note 53 (noting, for example that Alcoa 
significantly bolstered its disclosure language after the SEC adoption of the new rule in 
2010 and that Citigroup included diversity language where it provided none before). 
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likelihood of such a translation in at least two ways. First, the rule 
does not merely require disclosure on the existence of a diversity 
policy, but also requires disclosure about how the policy is being 
implemented, and how a corporation assesses the policy’s 
effectiveness.97 Such disclosure seems to require corporations to 
defend their diversity policy. The need to defend the policy should 
incentivize corporations to adopt policies that yield results. 
Importantly, in its study of board diversity, Virtcom found that the 
existence of an outlined strategy for implementing a diversity 
initiative may be an important factor in promoting a company’s 
overall profitability.98 Hence, requiring corporations to address the 
effectiveness of their diversity policy could increase the potential that 
such a policy will lead to greater diversity. In other words, such a 
requirement could increase public scrutiny of existing policies, 
thereby encouraging corporations to ensure that those policies 
produce results. Second, enhanced disclosure of policies that yield 
results not only could give companies without policies the confidence 
needed to adopt their own, but also could enhance overall diversity 
policies by providing a public platform for corporations to trade best 
practices in this area. 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the SEC’s adoption of a 
diversity disclosure rule may validate the importance of the business 
case for diversity. First, the very fact that the business case may have 
prompted the adoption of such a rule could be viewed as a critical 
example of the benefits of embracing the business case. Second, the 
rule not only may encourage more corporations to adopt diversity 
policies, but also may encourage corporations to ensure that those 
policies prove effective. Hence, it is possible that the rule could 
facilitate future changes in board diversity.   
Moreover, because it is possible that the SEC’s rule could 
facilitate future changes in board diversity, the current empirical data 
related to the progress of board diversity may be unreliable. From 
this perspective, it may be inappropriate to evaluate the impact of the 
business case until the SEC’s rule has had an opportunity to take 
effect. 
However, the nature of the SEC rule may undermine its ability 
to positively impact board diversity. As an initial matter, and perhaps 
most devastating to the rule’s potential effectiveness, is the SEC’s 
refusal to define diversity. Instead, the SEC left it for companies to 
 97. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010). 
 98. VIRTCOM WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 16. 
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define diversity “in ways that they consider appropriate.”99 While a 
corporation’s definition may include “concepts such as race, gender 
and national origin,” it also may include “differences of viewpoint, 
professional experience, education, skill and other individual qualities 
and attributes.”100 While these other characteristics may be relevant 
to good corporate governance, inclusion of them in the definition of 
diversity may significantly undermine the extent to which the new 
rule increases the number of women and people of color on the 
board. Instead, based on these criteria, many boards already may be 
able to define themselves as diverse, and thus may have no incentive 
to diversify their boards.101 The failure to define diversity could limit 
significantly the ability of the SEC’s new rule to alter the status quo 
with respect to racial and gender diversity on boards. 
Another important limitation on the rule’s impact may be that it 
does not require corporations to have an actual policy related to 
diversity.102 To be sure, it may be inappropriate for the SEC to 
require corporations to consider diversity in their board structure. 
However, the lack of such a requirement undermines the rule’s ability 
to influence adoption of diversity policies. Indeed, a Calvert study 
indicates that, in direct response to the SEC rule, one company 
(which previously had made no disclosure with respect to diversity) 
stated that it does not consider diversity in evaluating potential 
directors because the company does not believe that diversity “is 
relevant to a person’s qualifications to serve on the Board,” nor does 
the company believe that the diversity of a person’s background 
“significantly affect[s] a person’s ability to contribute to [the] 
Board.”103 Such disclosure not only reveals that some corporations do 
not consider diversity in their board recruitment, but also eloquently 
underscores the fact that the SEC rule may fail to encourage such 
consideration. 
 99. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,344. 
 100. Id.  
 101. To be sure, over the last few years, boards have increasingly focused on recruiting 
the same type of candidate—namely retired or active executives. SPENCER STUART, supra 
note 54, at 13. While these candidates may be diverse in their industry backgrounds, it is 
not clear that the candidates add to racial and gender diversity on boards. See id. 
 102. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010) (“If the nominating committee . . . has a 
policy with regard to the consideration of diversity in identifying director nominees, 
describe how this policy is implemented . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 103. Disclosure Scorecard, supra note 53 (describing disclosure from Lennar 
Corporation, which had previously made no disclosure with respect to its company’s 
consideration of diversity). 
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It also is possible that the new rule could discourage corporate 
adoption of diversity policies. Corporations may shy away from 
adopting a policy based on the fear that the corporation would be 
unable to adequately defend its effectiveness. In fact, at least one 
commentator has recommended that boards not institute a diversity 
policy for precisely this reason.104 With respect to this issue, the 
Calvert study demonstrates that while most corporations have 
responded to the new SEC rule by enhancing their disclosure on 
diversity and indicating their intention to consider diversity in 
connection with consideration of potential director candidates, 
several corporations made clear that they do not have a formal policy 
on board diversity.105 A corporation’s decision not to adopt such a 
formal policy may be designed to avoid the added burden of having to 
defend it. Hence, the rule may have the unintended consequence of 
limiting boards’ willingness to formalize their diversity efforts. 
As this discussion reveals, it is possible that the relative novelty 
of the SEC’s new rule makes it difficult to determine the impact of 
the business case on board diversity, particularly because the rule 
creates the possibility that board diversity will improve in the future. 
However, the SEC’s new rule has shortcomings that may hinder its 
overall effectiveness. These shortcomings raise considerable doubt 
that such a rule can enhance board diversity or otherwise serve as a 
successful example of the benefits associated with embracing the 
business case. 
C. The Fragility of the Empirical Case 
It is possible that the relative stagnation in board diversity 
reflects the fact that the corporate community is still unconvinced by 
the empirical evidence related to board diversity. As Part I reveals, 
the empirical evidence regarding the link between board diversity and 
 104. TK Kerstetter, And Your Definition of Board Diversity Is . . . , BOARD BLOG 
(Jan. 18, 2010, 7:51:50 AM), http://www.boardmember.com/The-Board-Blog-And-your-
definition-of-board-diversity-is.aspx?blogid=473. Kerstetter notes, “I wonder, after 
reading the disclosure language, if it wouldn’t be better for boards to have a formal policy 
on diversity going into this exercise. I say that because if you do, you will need to describe 
how the nominating and governance committee implements and assesses the effectiveness 
of that policy. It seems to me, if you aren’t very effective that it would just be better to 
have a statement on how the nominating committee looks at diversity in board 
composition and save being scrutinized on its effectiveness. The point here is that you will 
have to define it, and if a formal policy exists, you will have to defend it.” Id.  
 105. Those companies include Advanced Micro Devices Inc., AES Corp., AT&T Inc., 
Bucyrus International Inc., HCP Inc., Humana Inc., MEMC Electronic Materials Inc., 
Office Depot Inc., PPG Industries, T Rowe Price Group Inc., and TCF Financial Corp. See 
Disclosure Scorecard, supra note 53. 
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financial performance is mixed, with some studies suggesting no 
correlation or a negative correlation between the two.106 Moreover, 
several studies demonstrating more positive results have been 
criticized for their empirical shortcomings.107 Not only may the mixed 
empirical data suggest a need for more studies or more rigorous 
studies, but they also may explain why more corporations have not 
diversified their board—they are simply waiting for better empirical 
support. From this perspective, one may argue that additional or 
more rigorous empirical data in this area will eventually turn the tide 
in favor of increased board diversity.108 
Unfortunately, the mixed state of the data may be an inevitable 
by-product of efforts to measure board diversity. Indeed, it is not 
clear whether and to what extent further empirical studies will 
translate into more definitive support for the business case for at least 
two reasons. First, as researchers indicate, it is difficult to generate 
empirical evidence in this area because of the difficulties with 
collecting data and accurately pinpointing causation.109 In this regard, 
while we may have some improvement in this area, shoring up the 
empirical weaknesses may prove intractable. Second, the evidence in 
this area may be mixed precisely because the business case is nuanced 
and depends upon variables that may or may not exist within 
particular corporations.110 Such an observation suggests that the 
empirical flaws may be difficult, if not impossible, to definitively 
resolve. Thus, as one study notes, the empirical connection between 
board diversity and firm performance “may be too nuanced to 
statistically tease out.”111 Hence, if corporations are waiting for more 
empirically sound results before making more significant strides with 
respect to board diversity, then their wait may be in vain. 
 106. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 107. See Adams & Ferreira, supra note 40, at 292–93; see also Broome & Krawiec, 
supra note 1, at 433–34 (commenting generally on the difficulties of assessing the 
relationship between diversity and performance); Carter et al., supra note 22, at 400 
(comparing the available empirical data and noting that statistical methods, data, and time 
periods investigated vary greatly so that the results are not easily comparable). 
 108. See Adams & Ferreira, supra note 40, at 292 (noting the difficulties with 
interpreting the causal connection between board diversity and firm performance); 
Broome & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 433–34 (suggesting more empirical and theoretical 
work is required to better understand the impact of board diversity on performance); 
Rose, supra note 41, at 412 (suggesting more research and case studies are needed to 
better understand the impact of women on boards). 
 109. See, e.g., Broome & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 433–34. 
 110. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 810–38. 
 111. Carter et al., supra note 22, at 411. 
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Of course, the notion that the inability of the business case to 
impact board diversity is solely a function of the mixed or flawed 
empirical data is not entirely convincing. On the one hand, to the 
extent that corporations believe that some empirical foundation is 
necessary before implementing board diversity, one would expect the 
existence of positive studies in this area to have had at least some 
impact on those corporations’ diversity efforts. Indeed, there are at 
least some studies that have found positive links between board 
diversity and corporate performance.112 One would expect that, to the 
extent that data was the concern, such data would prove sufficient to 
convince at least some corporations to enhance their diversity efforts, 
and hence to trigger some changes in the diversity numbers. The fact 
that such data exists, and that stagnation continues in the area of 
board diversity, suggests that the problem is broader than one related 
to lack of empirical proof or rigor. 
Importantly, despite relatively mixed or flawed data with respect 
to other reforms, some corporations have been willing to embrace 
such reforms. For example, many experts agree that the empirical 
evidence related to the benefits of director independence is 
dubious.113 Despite this mixed evidence, boards enthusiastically 
embraced such independence even before reforms mandated it.114 
This acceptance demonstrates that corporations can and will adopt 
board reforms despite the fragility of the evidence concerning the 
benefits of that reform. As a result, the corporate willingness to 
embrace director independence despite mixed empirical evidence 
undermines the presumption that the mixed empirical evidence 
 112. See supra notes 30, 35 and accompanying text. 
 113. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 231 (2002); Jeffrey 
N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1500 (2007) 
(“Evidence that connects the increased presence of independent directors to shareholder 
benefit is weak at best.”); Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley As 
Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 
1864 (2007) (describing the evidence as “decidedly mixed”); Usha Rodrigues, The 
Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 455–58 (2008). 
 114. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 113, at 239 (illustrating that, prior to the 
enactment of federal reforms, the vast majority of public companies had boards with a 
supermajority of independent directors). To be sure, various federal rules currently 
require not only that the majority of a public board be independent, but also that certain 
committees be comprised completely of independent directors. See Fairfax, supra note 7, 
at 805–06 (describing rules). However, the movement toward a board with a majority of 
independent directors predated these rules. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 113, at 232–33 
(noting the push for independent directors in 2000). 
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related to board diversity is the sole or even motivating reason for the 
stagnation in this area.115 
D. Overstating the Business Case 
The inability of these other rationales to fully explain the 
stagnation in board diversity ultimately suggests that the reasons for 
the stagnation rest with the business case itself. In fact, diversity 
advocates may have overstated the importance of the business case 
while failing to appreciate the continued relevance of moral and 
social rationales for supporting board diversity. The next section 
explores why shortcomings associated with the business case may be 
the most compelling explanation for the relative stagnation in board 
diversity. 
1.  The Business Case Unveiled 
One reason why the business case has proved ineffective may be 
that there is no “pure” business case for board diversity. Instead, the 
business case is inextricably linked with the moral or social case for 
board diversity because moral and social rationales are embedded in 
the so-called business case. Thus, in describing the business case for 
board diversity, one researcher incorporates noneconomic rationales 
such as the signaling function of diversity as well as the extent to 
which diversity provides legitimacy with internal and external 
constituencies.116 Similarly, in buttressing its business case for board 
diversity, Catalyst identified a number of factors that have moral or 
social underpinnings.117 Specifically, Catalyst noted that board 
diversity signals a commitment to inclusion that is essential to hiring 
and retention, as well as a powerful antidote to stereotypes, and 
enables women to serve as role models in ways that may enhance the 
pipeline of available diversity candidates.118 While each of these 
rationales is connected to the corporation’s bottom line because it 
impacts the corporation’s ability to hire and retain qualified 
employees, such rationales also implicate social and moral 
justifications. The fact that market-based and social/moral-based 
 115. Of course it should be acknowledged that issues dealing with race and gender are 
some of the most sensitive. Hence, it could be that corporations and boards are less willing 
to take action in the face of mixed data when the reform involves such issues, as compared 
to reforms related to other issues. 
 116. See Carter et al., supra note 22, at 398. 
 117. See LOIS JOY, ADVANCING WOMEN LEADERS: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN 
WOMEN BOARD DIRECTORS AND WOMEN CORPORATE OFFICERS 8–9 (2008), available 
at http://www.catalyst.org/file/229/wco_wbd_web.pdf. 
 118. See id. 
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rationales are intertwined within the business case may explain the 
difficulties with empirical proof in this area. More importantly, it 
highlights the importance of not discarding social and moral 
rationales, and shows that seeking to advance diversity by reference 
only to economic rationales may prove ineffective. 
2.  The Pool Problem Revisited 
In the context of corporate boards, the pool problem refers to 
the notion that the pool of candidates that satisfy the criteria for 
serving on corporate boards, particularly large public corporate 
boards, is relatively small.119 Board studies reveal that corporations 
favor directors who have executive-level experience.120 Hence, in 
2007, ninety-six percent of Fortune 1000 boards had one or more 
directors who was a retired executive, and such status reflected the 
most common characteristic of the directors.121 Indeed, most directors 
are active or retired CEOs or other corporate executives who have 
headed a division or been a functional unit leader.122 The number of 
people of color and women who fit this profile is relatively small.123 
As a result, corporations that focus on these kinds of criteria may 
experience a pool problem with respect to finding diverse director 
candidates. 
To be sure, corporations may have exaggerated the extent to 
which the pool problem represents a significant hurdle to board 
 119. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 815; cf. Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and 
Retention of Minorities and Women on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
537, 547 (1988) (discussing the pool problem in legal academia); Daniel A. Farber, The 
Outmoded Debate over Affirmative Action, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 893, 918–24 (1994) (noting 
the pool problem in the context of education and employment); Randall L. Kennedy, 
Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1813–14 (1989) (discussing 
the pool problem in legal academia); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There 
So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms?: An Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L. 
REV. 493, 503–06 (1996) (addressing the pool problem in corporate law firms). 
 120. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 12–13. 
 121. See KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 62, at 18. 
 122. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 13. 
 123. Fairfax, supra note 7, at 816–17. The pool problem is not unique to the world of 
corporate directors. See, e.g., Chused, supra note 119, at 547 (demonstrating a pool 
problem in legal academia); Farber, supra note 119, at 918–24 (asserting that the 
educational gap, beginning at an early age, restricts the pool of qualified minority 
personnel); Kennedy, supra note 119, at 1813–14 (stating that nonprejudicial factors play a 
role in the limited pool of minority legal scholars); Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 119, at 
503–06 (addressing a theory that blacks are underrepresented in corporate law, though 
noting the difficulty of establishing the limits of the pool). 
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diversity.124 This is because there are relatively few legal requirements 
for board service, and none of those requirements demands that 
board members have specific forms of experience or backgrounds.125 
Moreover, while it is undeniable that board service requires some 
understanding of financial matters and corporate affairs, there are no 
studies indicating that enhanced board or corporate performance is 
linked to ensuring that a majority or a supermajority of board 
members have executive-level expertise. Instead, boards or 
committees comprised of directors with previous managerial 
experience may have biases in favor of management that could 
undermine their ability to be independent and objective.126 In this 
regard, the focus on overpopulating the board with prior executives 
may have negative consequences. More importantly, the fact that 
corporations gravitate toward board members with particular 
backgrounds and experience is a function of custom rather than any 
legal rules.127 From this perspective, because the pool problem stems 
from custom rather than legal regimes, one may question the 
legitimacy of the problem. 
Nevertheless, the pool problem remains a significant obstacle. 
Indeed, as a practical matter, boards continue to prefer particular 
types of experiences that too often are not typical of people of 
color.128 
Importantly, however, diversity advocates likely hoped that the 
business case would motivate corporations to take steps aimed at 
 124. Fairfax, supra note 7, at 817; cf. Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 119, at 503–06 
(describing the problem of actually defining the relevant pool for corporate law firms in 
hiring associates). 
 125. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.02 (2002) (allowing corporations to 
designate board requirements in the articles of incorporation or bylaws). In recent years, 
various SEC and federal listing rules have limited the discretion of public corporations in 
this area by imposing requirements related to financial expertise and independence. See 
Fairfax, supra note 7, at 805–08, 816 (describing independence requirements). However, 
none of these rules demand that directors have previous executive-level experience in 
order to serve on a board. 
 126. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 33–34 (2004) 
(noting that directors who are executives or former executives may have biases in favor of 
management). 
 127. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 12–13 (explaining that corporations show 
preference for directors with executive experience). 
 128. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 807–10. It is also important to note that even if boards 
were willing to seek diverse candidates outside of this narrow pool, it is not clear that such 
actions would prove beneficial to those candidates. Instead, it could be that those 
candidates would feel excluded or be given less credence if their backgrounds or 
experience levels were perceived as less favorable than those of their white counterparts. 
Thus, whether the pool problem results from legal or extra-legal forces, it continues to 
serve as a practical road block to board diversity. 
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addressing the pool problem. Indeed, the pool problem is 
longstanding. Diversity advocates likely believed that convincing 
corporations of board diversity’s importance to their financial bottom 
line would convince them to engage in more aggressive recruiting 
efforts that extended beyond their traditional pool of candidates and 
to take steps to expand the pipeline of available diverse candidates. 
To be sure, some corporations and organizations have taken steps to 
enhance the pipeline in this area,129 and the results of those steps 
might not materialize for some time. However, it is not clear whether 
and to what extent corporations have actively sought to extend their 
search for diverse candidates. Instead, director recommendations 
appear to continue to come from “the usual sources,” and hence, 
corporations have not been expansive in their search for diverse 
candidates.130 
The fact that greater embrace of the business case may not have 
translated into more aggressive efforts to ameliorate the pool 
problem suggests that the business case has not had its desired effect. 
Moreover, it raises concerns about whether appeals to economic 
impulses can prompt directors to engage in broader efforts in this 
area. Indeed, in many ways, overcoming the pool problem requires a 
leap of faith because it requires corporations to expend resources in 
developing a stronger pipeline without proof that this development 
will have immediate results. It is likely that moral or social appeals 
may prove more effective than those that speak solely in terms of 
economics because they do not require concrete data; instead, they 
focus on “doing the right thing.”131 Then too, overcoming the pool 
problem may require directors to make personal commitments that 
may move them beyond their comfort zones.132 Characterizing 
diversity in market terms may have suggested that such directors need 
 129. For example, DirectWomen markets itself as “the only program specifically 
designed to identify, develop, and support a select group of accomplished women 
attorneys to provide qualified directors needed by the boards of U.S. companies, while 
promoting the independence and diversity required for good corporate governance.” 
About DirectWomen: Overview, DIRECTWOMEN, http://directwomen.org/about (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2011). Corporate sponsors of DirectWomen include Kraft Foods and 
Walmart. DirectWomen Board Institute: 2009 Sponsors, DIRECTWOMEN, http://direct 
women.org/sponsorship/2009-sponsors/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). 
 130. See, e.g., SPENCER STUART, supra note 54, at 16.  
 131. See Gordon, supra note 5, at 1277; Knapp & Grover, supra note 5, at 303; Taylor’s 
Perspective, supra note 5, at 4. 
 132. See Stacy Blake-Bear et al., Unfinished Business: The Impact of Race on 
Understanding Mentoring Relationships 12 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Organizational Behavior 
Faculty Unit, Working Paper No. 06-060, 2006), available at http://www.hbs.edu/ 
research/pdf/06-060.pdf. 
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not move beyond—and may have encouraged directors to remain 
in—their comfort zones. By contrast, a moral or social appeal may 
have better luck in ensuring that directors make a personal 
commitment in this area. Thus, relying on market or economic terms 
may have served to depersonalize the board diversity issue in ways 
that proved unproductive. 
3.  Ingrained Biases 
There has been a recent surge of interest in literature indicating 
that even people who perceive themselves as tolerant have 
“unconscious” or “ingrained” biases that influence their behavior 
when they interact with people of different races or genders.133 
Importantly, the literature suggests that unconscious biases cause 
people to misunderstand how they would behave in the context of 
issues dealing with race or gender.134 
To be sure, some question the link between ingrained bias and 
discriminatory behavior. For example, some insist that studies 
regarding ingrained bias simply reflect the influence of prejudice, and 
reach the overbroad conclusion that “we are all racists at heart.”135 
Others note that “researchers should exercise caution before 
suggesting that a given individual or group of individuals holds 
unconscious racist attitudes.”136 However, research does indicate that 
people can engage in unconscious, racially biased behavior.137 
In the corporate setting, these ingrained biases, as opposed to 
overt discrimination and racism, may serve as one of the most 
 133. See, e.g., Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE 
NATURE OF REMEMBERING 117, 136–37 (Henry L. Roediger, III et al. eds., 2001); John 
Dovido & Samuel Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2004); Kerry Kawakami et al., Mispredicting Affective and Behavioral 
Responses to Racism, 323 SCIENCE 276, 276 (2009); Howard Ross, Proven Strategies for 
Addressing Unconscious Bias in the Workplace, CDO INSIGHTS, Aug. 2008, at 1, 2, 
available at http://www.cookross.com/docs/UnconsciousBias.pdf; Eben Harrell, Study: 
Racist Attitudes Are Still Ingrained, TIME (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/ 
health/article/0,8599,1870408,00.html. In a study that tracked 4,100 MBA students who 
graduated between 1996 and 2007, researchers found that women continue to lag behind 
men at every career stage. See Nancy M. Carter & Christine Silva, Women in Management: 
Delusions of Progress, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2010, at 19, 19–20. Researchers attributed 
at least part of that lag to the fact that “businesses may be inadvertently overlooking bias 
that creeps in at initial job placement.” Id. at 21. 
 134. See Kawakami et al., supra note 133, at 276–78; Harrell, supra note 133. 
 135. Amy Wax & Philip Tetlock, We’re All Racists at Heart, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2005, 
at A16.  
 136. Hart Blanton & James Jaccard, Unconscious Racism: A Concept in Pursuit of a 
Measure, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 277, 284 (2008). 
 137. Id. at 293. 
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challenging impediments for women and people of color.138 From this 
perspective, such biases also may influence the board selection and 
retention process. Moreover, such biases may be a more important 
factor in determining whether board diversity increases. 
On the one hand, it seems more likely that moral or social 
appeals will prove more effective in combating ingrained biases than 
economic ones. On the other hand, it could be that painting these 
rationales in market terms has enabled corporations to ignore 
confronting the more difficult issues associated with ingrained biases. 
Ultimately, the fact that moral or social appeals may better respond 
to these hurdles associated with board diversity reflects the notion 
that the business case is insufficient on its own to fully advance board 
diversity. Underscoring this point, after analyzing the available and 
conflicting data related to the business case for board diversity, one 
recent study concludes that the case for board diversity should not 
rest solely on the impact of such diversity on a firm’s financial 
performance.139 
CONCLUSION 
In recent years, diversity advocates have relied on business 
rationales to support their efforts to increase board diversity. This 
reliance stemmed from perceived defects in the effectiveness of social 
and moral rationales historically used to justify diversity efforts.140 It 
also stemmed from the supposition that the business case would 
better motivate corporate behavior than moral or social appeals. 
However, the empirical evidence suggests that the increased 
reliance on the business case has not translated into any appreciable 
gains in board diversity. Instead, there has been a relative stagnation 
in board diversity efforts even as more corporations and regulators 
appear willing to rhetorically embrace the business case. 
This stagnation, therefore, calls into question the strategy of 
supplanting moral and social rationales in favor of the business case. 
Moreover, the stagnation suggests that while the business rationale 
may have a role to play in advancing diversity efforts, the moral and 
social rationales also may be critical to that advancement. Thus, 
diversity advocates should not allow the business case to crowd out or 
otherwise completely displace moral appeals. The increased attention 
to the business case may have prevented diversity advocates from 
 138. See Ross, supra note 133, at 2, 6–8.  
 139. See Carter et al., supra note 22, at 412.  
 140. See Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1554–55. 
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focusing on ways to articulate and perhaps legitimize noneconomic 
rationales for board diversity. The stagnation suggests that such a 
focus is necessary to the board diversity effort. Indeed, the stagnation 
suggests that diversity advocates must create a strategy that 
effectively incorporates and validates moral and social justifications. 
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